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canari

io.github.lanbass869-cell/canari

Signed, offline-verifiable attestations for agent components; ALLOW/BLOCK/REVIEW per install.

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Canari

CI tests coverage mutation release Listed on mcpservers.org Canari on Glama

Agent component verification ledger - signed, offline-verifiable, history-preserving attestations for MCP servers, agent skills, and DSH plugins.

Named after the canary in the coal mine: the first to detect that something went wrong.

What it does

  1. Weekly scan of agent component ecosystems (npm, PyPI, MCP Registry, dsh.so)
  2. Each component gets a signed attestation: DSSE/Ed25519 envelope whose payload is an in-toto Statement v1 (subject[] with digest.sha256, predicateType, predicate) binding: artifact hash + host version + scan scenario. Readable by GUAC / cosign / slsa-verifier without Canari-specific code.
  3. Attestations are offline-verifiable by anyone with the public key
  4. History is never deleted - version changes create supersession chains
  5. Public machine-readable feed for any AI agent or host to consume
  6. Trust heuristics: release cadence (L2.4), metadata anomaly (L2.5), typosquatting (L2.6). Which of these appear in an attestation depends on the entry point - see Which checks come from which entry point.
  7. Consumer install gate with policies: canari-verify bundle.json --key pub.json --gate --gate-policy paranoid

Install

pip install canari-mcp

Also on PyPI and as a GitHub release (wheel + sdist + SHA256SUMS + Ed25519 signature). Both channels ship byte-identical artifacts; see docs/release-process.md to verify the signed release.

canari-gate --store out --list

Open dataset

dataset/ is the published snapshot of the ledger under CC-BY-4.0: 5170 signed attestations over 1417 components, the canonical feed, drift reports, the schema, both public keys and a MANIFEST.json with a sha256 per file. Verify a bundle offline with canari-verify; verify the whole snapshot with the manifest (see dataset/README.md). Refresh it after a scan with python scripts/sync_dataset.py.

Append-only public log (verifiable without trusting us)

Every published verdict bundle and every upstream dataset snapshot is committed into a signed, append-only Merkle log at docs/log/. This closes a gap that a signature alone cannot: a signed attestation proves who said something, never that an older statement was not quietly deleted or re-issued with a different verdict.

  • Latest head: docs/log/head-latest.json (size, root, Ed25519 signature)
  • Latest offline bundle: docs/log/bundle-latest.json
  • c2sp.org checkpoint: docs/log/checkpoint.txt -- the same head as a signed note in c2sp.org/tlog-checkpoint + signed-note + tlog-cosignature form, so an existing transparency-log witness can co-sign it without adopting anything of ours. Pinned against another project's published test vectors (tests/test_checkpoint.py).
  • Format: docs/spec/append-only-log.md (RFC 9162 hashing, inclusion + consistency proofs, explicit list of what the proof does not claim)
  • Cross-implementation vectors: docs/spec/merkle-vectors.json (168 cases), checked by two independent verifiers
# no network, no canari install needed for the Node path
node docs/spec/verify_offline.js docs/log/bundle-latest.json --log-id canari-snapshot-log

# "the head I recorded yesterday is still a prefix of today's"
python -m canari.verify_offline docs/log/bundle-latest.json \
  --pinned-prefix <root-you-saved-last-week>

A new head is appended daily by .github/workflows/append-only-log.yml. The publish path refuses to sign (LogTruncated / LogRewritten) if the on-disk log contradicts a head it already published, because a log that re-signs a rewrite under its own key manufactures false assurance.

Quality gates (enforced in CI)

GateThresholdCurrent
testsgreen on 3.10/3.12/3.13762 passing (11 env-skip: 10 network + 1 platform)
line coverage>= 85%86.4% line, 84.6% branch (85.1% combined; CI gates on combined)
mutation kill rate>= 90% (equivalent mutants excluded)100% (47/47 killed + 2 equivalent, 3 skipped)
live-data auditsampled attestations re-derive from npm/PyPI18/18

Run them yourself: python scripts/quality_gate.py

Quick start

# install
pip install canari-mcp

# run a scan
canari-baseline --limit 50

# verify an attestation offline
canari-verify out/attestations/npm_some-package.bundle.json --key out/public_key.json

# verify + policy gate (exit 0 ALLOW / 5 BLOCK / 6 REVIEW)
canari-verify out/attestations/npm_some-package.bundle.json --key out/public_key.json \\
    --gate --gate-policy strict

# custom policy file
canari-verify bundle.json --key out/public_key.json --gate --gate-policy-file my-policy.json

Policy file example

{"name": "my-policy", "block_on_findings": true, "require_native_provenance": false}

Consumer side (the part a host actually uses)

1. Look up a component and gate it

# resolve the newest signed attestation for a component and run the gate
canari-gate --store out --registry npm --name express
canari-gate --store out --registry dsh-registry --name aegis --policy paranoid --json

# exit codes: 0 ALLOW, 5 BLOCK, 6 REVIEW, 3 not found
canari-gate --store out --list

2. Record another scanner's result as a signed, timestamped attestation

Live example: 20 PyPI MCP servers, scanned by bandit, recorded and signed - every record on that page can be verified with canari-verify using the public key shipped beside it.

Canari does not scan anything itself. What it adds is durability: a scanner tells you what it thinks today, Canari records what it said on each date, signed and offline-verifiable, and keeps the history when the verdict flips.

canari-ingest-sarif reads a SARIF 2.1.0 report from any external scanner (NVIDIA SkillSpector, Snyk agent-scan, Tencent AI-Infra-Guard, ...) and writes a normal Canari bundle:

canari-ingest-sarif \
  --sarif skillspector.sarif \
  --name @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem --version 2025.1.0 \
  --registry npm \
  --artifact-sha256 <sha256 of the scanned artifact> \
  --key out/private_key.pem --out out/attestations

Rules it enforces, so the ledger cannot become a rubber stamp:

  • The upstream tool is named, not hidden. Every check records tool = <scanner>/<version> and checker.id says it was ingested by Canari.
  • The artifact digest is required. A scan result without the scanned artifact's sha256 cannot be bound to anything, so the command refuses.
  • An unusable report is an error, not a pass. No run block, or executionSuccessful: false, yields verdict error.
  • Findings move the verdict. Critical/high → fail; lower severity → pass-with-findings; no findings → pass.

2. Drift report (what changed since last week)

canari-drift --store out --write out/drift
# verdict flips / same-version silent changes / findings added / findings removed

run_weekly.py writes this report automatically after every scan.

3. Use it from any MCP host (dsh, Codex, Claude, ...)

canari-mcp speaks MCP over stdio (zero dependencies) and exposes three tools: gate_check, verify_bundle, store_summary.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "canari": {
      "command": "canari-mcp"
    }
  }
}

No arguments needed: the wheel ships a snapshot of the newest signed attestation per component (1417 components, rebuilt by scripts/build_snapshot.py from dataset/), so gate_check answers out of the box. Point --store (or $CANARI_STORE) at a full ledger checkout when you want the complete supersession history instead of the snapshot.

A host (or agent) can then ask: "is npm:express allowed to install?" and get ALLOW / BLOCK / REVIEW with reasons, backed by a signed, offline-verifiable attestation.

4. Gate the actual install command

canari-guard wraps an install command, checks every component against the ledger, and refuses to execute when the verdict blocks:

canari-guard -- dsh plugin --profile wbpj add dsh-purge
canari-guard -- npm install some-mcp-server
canari-guard -- pip install mcp-server-fetch==0.2.1

# exit 0 allowed+executed | 5 blocked by ledger | 6 review not confirmed
# --dry-run prints what would run; --allow-review accepts pass-with-findings

The host is never patched - the guard sits in front of the install command.

For DeepSeek Harness (dsh), add this to the profile's cordis.patch.yml (verified end-to-end on dsh: the model called mcp__canari__store_summary and received the live component count):

    - id: mcp-canari
      name: '@deepseek-ai/dsh-mcp-client'
      config:
        serverName: canari
        transport: stdio
        command: 'E:\Temp\tbdig\_venv_pr_a\Scripts\python.exe'
        args: ['-m', 'canari.mcp_server', '--store', 'E:\Temp\tbdig\canari\out',
               '--key', 'E:\Temp\tbdig\canari\out\public_key.json']
        cwd: 'E:\Temp\tbdig\canari'
        failOnStartupError: true

Multi-registry coverage

RegistrySourceWhat we checkWhat we inherit
npmsearch API + packument + tarball sha256existence, version, artifact hash, maintainers-
PyPISimple API + JSON APIsame-
MCP Registryofficial RESTidentity presence-
dsh.soJSON APIreference existing L1-L5 conclusions (not re-scanned)dsh.so verdicts

Which checks come from which entry point

Two entry points produce attestations, and they do not run the same checks. That is deliberate: a single-component CLI has no comparison corpus, so it cannot answer a question about a set.

checkcanari-baseline (one component)weekly scan / run_multi
L1.1 registry presentyesyes
L1.2 version resolvedyes-
L2.1 artifact hashyesyes
L2.2 maintainer setyes-
L2.3 manifest fieldsyes-
L2.4 release cadenceyesyes
L2.5 metadata anomaly-yes
L2.6 typosquattingnoyes
L2.7 / L2.8 dsh plugin refs-yes (dsh only)

L2.6 is absent from the single-component path because a typosquat verdict is a statement about a set of names, not about one name. When it does run, the row records the set it compared against:

"comparison_corpus": {
  "registry": "pypi",
  "kind": "name-set",
  "size": 620,
  "digest": "sha256:...",
  "canonicalization": "sha256(utf-8, casefolded names sorted asc, LF-joined, trailing LF)",
  "as_of": "2026-11-16T05:31:35Z"
}

plus a corpus:<registry>:sha256:...:n=<size> line in evidence_refs. Without it the same package can be "clean" against five names and "a typosquat" against six hundred; see docs/analysis-corpus-dependence.md for the measurements. A small size is itself the warning: n=1 cannot produce a typosquat finding at all.

Honest limitations

  • This is a risk signal, not a safety guarantee
  • M0/M1 covers meta-level checks (L1-L2); behavioral checks (L3+) are M1+
  • Scan coverage is limited to what registries expose publicly
  • expires_at is 7 days - attestations go stale, re-scan needed
  • L2.6 verdicts are relative to the recorded comparison corpus. Comparing two attestations that used different corpora is not a comparison of the packages.

The threat model this addresses

postmark-mcp (MITRE ATLAS AML.CS0053): 15 clean versions, then one poisoned commit, ~300 orgs affected. After takedown, no host was notified. The gap: no longitudinal observation, no cross-host revocation feed, no portable verdict.

Canari fills that gap.

License

Apache-2.0. See LICENSE and SECURITY.md.

PYPI
canari-mcp
Install Command
pip install canari-mcp